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Abstract 
Problems of the field of Ecological Economics are inherently complex and by definition involve trade-offs among multiple 
criteria. Moreover, the decisions made involve multiple parties, often with conflicting interests. For these reasons, the multiple 
criteria decision aid (MCDA) paradigm appears as a valuable tool for the field of Ecological Economics and indeed as an 
indispensable tool in the cases where participatory decisions must be made. In this work we apply a robustness-oriented MCDA 
approach to reach a solution for a land use problem in Northern Greece. The mathematical modeling as well as the case study 
results are presented. 
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
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1. Introduction 
Problems of the field of Ecological Economics are inherently complex and by definition involve trade-offs 
among multiple criteria [1]. There are a number of reasons to avoid a single criteria approach [2] like neglecting 
certain aspects of realism and presenting features of one particular value-system as objective, just to name a few. 
Moreover, often the decisions made affect bigger sets than single humans (towns, cities or even larger geographical 
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territories, local or national populations, societies etc.). Therefore, it is expected that multiple parties are involved in 
the decision process. For these reasons, the multiple criteria decision aid (MCDA) paradigm appears as a valuable 
tool for the field of Ecological Economics [3] and indeed as an indispensable tool in the cases where participatory 
decisions must be made [4]. 
Considering the evaluation of the natural capital and the ecosystem services, perhaps the most visible work is the 
work of Costanza et al. [5]. Several approaches using multiple evaluation factors have been presented [6], however 
the vast majority of works considers the ecological and the financial factor, underestimating the significance of the 
social factors. Neglecting or underestimating these factors leads to a misjudgment about the real value (or demand) 
of the ecosystem services for stakeholders. In [7], authors try to integrate social factors into the ecosystem service 
appraisal with a social welfare weight using the Ruoergai Plateau Marshes as a case study. However, the Analytic 
Hierarchy Process which is used as the multiple criteria tool, has been systematically criticized [8], [9]. 
In this work we apply a novel MCDA algorithm to support the decision about the land use in the area of Paggaio, 
Kavala, Greece. In particular, a convenience sample if six local stakeholders was interviewed to express its 
preferences about some cultivation alternatives (land use for photovoltaic systems was also included). The proposed 
method can be characterized as an attempt to combine preference relations with a UTA approach, which is actually a 
new trend aggregation – disaggregation approaches [10]. The idea of considering the whole set of compatible value 
functions to deal with ranking and choice problems was originally introduced in the UTAGMS method [11], and 
further generalized in GRIP[12]. 
The family of the UTA methods has been also used in several studies of conflict resolution in multi-actor 
decision situations [13]. These studies refer to the development and application of group decision or negotiation 
support systems [14], [15], [16]. Beside UTA methods, Matsatsinis and Samaras [17] review several other 
aggregation- disaggregation approaches incorporated in group decision support systems. While group decision 
approaches aim to achieve consensus among the group of DMs or at least attempt to reduce the amount of conflict 
by compensation, collective decision methods focus on the aggregation of the DMs’ preferences. Therefore, in the 
latter case, the collective results are able to determine preferential inconsistencies among the DMs, and to define 
potential interactions (trade-off process) that may achieve a higher group and/or individual consistency level. 
 The problem formulation and the model of the constructed linear problem are presented in the next Section, 
while a special section is dedicated to the robustness point of view of the method. Finally, preliminary results of the 
case study as well as some general conclusions are presented in the following sections. 
2. Problem Modeling 
Let m be the number of the decision makers involved in the problem under discussion. These decision makers 
(DMs) act as autonomous, self-interest agents. The notation },...,,{ 21 mDDDD   shall be used to symbolize 
them. Every agent (DM) has a weight of significance for the decision ruler (who is usually the responsible authority, 
as appointed by the government). This weight could represent the relative value that every agent has for the local 
society, its expertise level or it could be a parameter defined by formal statements. In any case, there should always 
be  1wm
1t t¦   . 
Let n be the number of criteria },...,,{ 21 ngggG  , which will be used to evaluate the alternative solutions. 
The alternative solutions set can be of any finite size and it shall be notated as ,...},{ baA  . Alternative solutions 
in this paper are nothing else than land usage, i.e., alternative ways to exploit land. Besides the existing solutions, 
the methodology suggested in this work introduces a set of reference alternatives RA . According to [18] this set 
could be: a set of past decision alternatives past actions; a subset of decision actions, especially when A is large; or a 
set of fictitious actions, consisting of performances on the criteria, which can be easily judged by agents to perform 
global comparisons. 
The concept of reference alternatives is common in the aggregation-disaggregation paradigm of the MCDA, 
however, the novelty of this method consists in non demanding a complete comparisons table. In particular, every 
agent (DM) is asked to express his/her preferences over just a subset of these reference alternatives. Representing by 
287 Pavlos Delias et al. /  Procedia Technology  8 ( 2013 )  285 – 291 
RtA  the set of the reference alternatives used for comparisons by the tth agent, the following should hold: 
RmRRR AAAA  ...21 . In order to compare alternatives, let us denote a preference relation S on AAu , in 
a way that a means “alternative a is at least as good as b”. 
The ultimate goal of the methodology is to model the collective preferences of agents (DMs). To this end an 
additive value function u is introduced as following:    ¦   
n
j jj
gugu
1
 . Each  jj gu  is piecewise linear 
on   ^ `ajjjjjjj gggGgu ,...,,, 21  being the number of level of performance of the jth criterion. In addition, the 
worst and the best performance have standard values as:    ¦     
n
j
aj
jjjj gujgu 1 1,0 . Finally, the 
preferences relation is expressed on a value function basis as:  > @  > @ 0t bguaguaSb . 
3. A Robustness-oriented Algorithm 
Each agent provides just two basic pieces of information: The first consists of a set of pairwise comparisons of 
some reference alternatives. These comparisons are made in terms of the preference relation defined in the previous 
section. This way, the tth decision maker provides a comparisons set RRt AAR u , which could be of any size and 
include any reference alternatives. A comparison in that set (a row of the matrix) would indicate two alternatives 
(e.g. a and b) for which the preference relation a holds. The second piece of information needed is a set of intensities 
about the preference relations between couples of alternatives of RtA . Again, this comparisons’ set does not have to 
be complete. More specifically, let tI  be the set of the “intensities” of the tth decision maker. An element of tI  
would declare if a comparison (an element in tR ) is more “intense” than any other element in tR . For example, a is 
more intensive than c. 
The collective value function will be calculated through a linear regression problem. To this end, two variables 
tkz  and tpy  are introduced. The former refers to the kth preference relationship of the tth agent and the latter to the 
pth intensity declared by the tth agent. The linear problem is formulated as follows: 
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Robustness analysis of the results provided by the Linear Problem is considered as a post-optimality analysis 
problem. What is actually applied is a slight alteration of the polyhedron defined by the constraints of the initial 
linear problem. The polyhedron is augmented by the additional constraint HH ,,  d zzz  being the minimal 
error of the initial LP, and H a very small positive number. A number of  ¦   
n
j j
aT
1
1  new linear problems 
are constructed and T value functions are calculated by maximizing and minimizing each 
value   jljj alnjgu ,...,2;,...,2,1,   , on the augmented polyhedron. 
As a measure for the robustness of the marginal value functions the average stability indices )(iASI  are used. An 
average stability index )(iASI  is the mean value of the normalized standard deviation of the estimated marginal 
values on ith criterion and is calculated as 
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Where kju  is the estimated value of the kth parameter in the jth additive value function. 
The global robustness measure will be the average of )(iASI  over all the criteria. If robustness measures are 
judged satisfactory, i.e. ASI indices are close to 1, then the final solution is calculated as the barrycentral value 
function. Else, the sets tR  and tI  should be enriched for one or more agents. The way to guide the tR  and tI  
redefinition process is by checking the magnitude of the variables tkz  and tpy . In particular, the larger these 
variables are, the greater the inconsistency they will prompt. So, Decision Makert (who is related with tkz  and tpy ) 
shall be contacted by priority and thus the whole process (depicted inFig. 1) is guided by the robustness of the final 
solution. 
Fig. 1 The Flow chart of the Robustness-oriented algorithm 
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4. The Case Study 
The land of Paggaio, Kavala although very rich (after reclaiming a dried lake in 1930) has been cultivated in 
ways that affected both local environment and economies in a disadvantageous manner. Six local stakeholders – 
experts who represent different points of view were interviewed (two farmers, an agronomist, the president of local 
agricultural cooperatives, a resident and a complete feed mill owner) and expressed their preferences for 11 different 
land uses. The eleven alternatives for land use are a) Cultivation of colza (to extract oil and exploit the cake left), b) 
Cultivation of white poplar (Populus alba – Salicaceae) for the paper industry and biofuels, c) Sugar beets 
(cultivated Beta vulgaris) for biofuels and the food industry, d) Helianthus (sunflower) to mainly be used as a 
biofuel, e) Stevia for pharmaceutical or food industry, f) Photovoltaic parks, g) Barley for mash production, h) 
Wheat for the same purpose, i) Soybean also mash production, j) Maize and k) Pomegranate for the food industry as 
well as for pharmaceuticals. 
Each alternative is evaluated against every criterion using a textual, ordinal 5-level scale. This multicriteria 
evaluation table is the same for all stakeholders. All stakeholders will express their preferences, however, not all are 
the same influential, namely, the “importance weight” of each might differ. In this case, stakeholders were selected 
based on a convenience basis, according to their profession – position and the following weights were assigned: 0.4 
for the agronomist (C6), 0.2 for the president of local cooperatives (C1), 0.13 for the feed mill owner (C4), 0.1 for 
each farmer (C3& C5) and 0.07 for the resident (C2). These weights indicate the trade-off between the “expertise” of 
two stakeholders, while it is required to sum up to 1. Stakeholders are provided with the multicriteria evaluation 
table, and they express their preferences with statements like the ones described in the Problem Modeling section. In 
our case the stakeholders’ preferences are presented in Table 1    Table 1: 
    Table 1. Stakeholders' preferences 
Stakeholder Preferences Intensities 
C1 {fSk, fSi, jSk, jSi, kSi} [1,3;2,5] 
C2 {fSc, fSd, fSk, cSd, cSk} [2,1; 2,3;3,5] 
C3 {jSc, jSf, jSk, jSd, cSk, cSd, fSk, fSd} [1,8;1,7;4,5] 
C4 {fSj, fSi, fSh, jSh, jSi, hSi} [1,2;2,4;4,6] 
C5 {fSd, fSi, dSk, fSc, dSc, iSc, kSc} [1,2;2,7;5,7] 
C6 {fSi, fSd, fSk, jSi, jSd, jSk, jSi, iSk, dSk} [1,2;1,8;5,1] 
 
 
    Table 1 represents stakeholders’ preferences in terms of pairwise comparisons (when such a comparison 
makes sense for the stakeholder) and in terms of intensities between those pairwise comparisons. The preferences 
set for each stakeholder contains the preference relations he declares (for instance C1has declared that “alternative f 
is at least as good as k”, “alternative f is at least as good as i”, “alternative j is at least as good as k” etc. The 
intensities matrix contains as many rows as the number of the intensities declared (rows are separated by 
columns).Each row contains two numerical values, which correspond to the indices of the preferences relations 
involved.  
For instance, row 1 can be interpreted like the following: The president of local cooperatives prefers the 
implementation of photovoltaic parks to the cultivation of pomegranate and to the cultivation of soybean, as well as 
he prefers the cultivation of maize to pomegranate and to soybean. He also prefers the cultivation of pomegranate to 
soybean. However, he considers his preference of photovoltaic system to pomegranate to be greater (more intense) 
than his preference of maize to soybean. The interesting part is that stakeholders do not need to express their 
preferences over the entire set of alternatives nor they need to declare intensities for every pair of relations. This is 
an important advantage of the proposed method that provides great flexibility to both the decision analysts and 
stakeholders. 
Having solved the LP, results are presented in Table 2, however the overall ASI index is quite low. This means 
that additional input data (further clarifications on DMs’ preferences) are needed. In particular, the need is for the 
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DMs with the largest tkz  and tpy  values (i.e., the president of cooperatives, the feed mill owner and the resident in 
descending order) to complement their preferences data. Moreover, additional intensities could be requested to make 
input information richer. The new data are presented in Table 3. Then a new iteration (re-solve the LP) follows and 
the robustness of the new results is re-evaluated.  
 
 
 
 
    Table 2. Preliminary Results (Iteration 1& 2) 
Criterion Weight (iter 1 / 2) ASI (iter 1 / 2) 
Environment friendliness 17%/  18% 0.44 / 0.44 
Exploitation of Natural Resources 21% / 19% 0.49 / 0.46 
Land reuse potential 18% / 17% 0.52 /  0.51 
Economical Performance 11% / 10% 0.44 / 0.44 
Available Information 15% / 16% 0.45 / 0.45 
Investment Attractiveness 18% / 18% 1 / 1 
 
    Table 3. Stakeholders' preferences update 
Stakeholder Preferences Intensities 
C1 {fSk, fSi, jSk, jSi, kSi, fSh, fSg, jSg, kSh, kSg, hSg} [1,3;2,5; 4,12] 
C2 {fSc, fSd, fSk, cSd, cSk, fSj, fSi, cSj, cSi, dSj, dSi, kSj, kSi, jSi} [2,1; 2,3;3,5; 10,9] 
C3 {jSc, jSf, jSk, jSd, cSk, cSd, fSk, fSd} [1,8;1,7;4,5] 
C4 {fSj, fSi, fSh, jSh, jSi, his, fSc, fSd, fSg, jSc, jSd, jSg, hSc, hSd, hSg, iSc, iSd, iSg, dSc, gSc} [1,2;2,4;4,6; 
19,20] 
C5 {fSd, fSi, dSk, fSc, dSc, iSc, kSc} [1,2;2,7;5,7] 
C6 {fSi, fSd, fSk, jSi, jSd, jSk, jSi, iSk, dSk} [1,2;1,8;5,1] 
 
As it can be seen from     Table 2 (iteration 2 elements), the ASI index is even lower after the new data. This is of 
course not a fortunate event since it signifies that the assessed collective model is not robust. This can be explained 
by the rigid attitude of the stakeholders who instead of adjusting their preferences with the rest ones, they prefer to 
intensify their personal opinion with additional declaration. The results demonstrate that this is a hard negotiation 
problem. Potential conflict resolution strategies would be to include more stakeholders into the process, to modify 
the stakeholders’ weights, to eliminate certain decision criteria or certain land use alternatives. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this work a multi-criteria methodology to support the land use decision was presented. What guide the 
reasoning component are the collective preferences of all stakeholders. Therefore, the final solution depends in a 
very direct way on the stakeholder’s rationality. This infuses the system with an impressive flexibility but also with 
a disagreeable subjectivity. More specifically, modelling stakeholders as rational optimizers based on the suggested 
multiple criteria approach there emerge the same limitations with those of classical decision aid: There is a fuzzy 
borderline between what is and what is not feasible in real decision making contexts; the Decision makers’ have 
seldom well shaped preferences. “In and among areas of firm convictions lie hazy zones of uncertainty, half held 
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belief, or indeed conflicts and contradictions”[19]; many data are imprecise, uncertain, or ill-defined. In addition, 
sometimes, data may not be reflected appropriately into linear utility functions. Even more, in a real-world context, 
we shall not neglect complexity and time-issues: decisions have to be made in real time. 
Despite the above limitations, the multiple criteria paradigm emerges as an endeavour to make an objective place 
for agents’ decisions. It provides a way to formalize pro-activeness guiding stakeholders to rational and transparent 
decisions. 
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